



RLUIPA’s Equal-Terms Provision’s Troubling 
Definition of Equal: Why the Equal-Terms 
Provision Must Be Interpreted Narrowly 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Protestors gathered outside a meeting of the Manhattan Community 
Board 1 in mid-August 2010.1  The board was holding a public-comment 
period followed by a vote on the contentious Ground Zero mosque, 
otherwise known as Park51.  The proposed development included a 
thirteen-story Muslim cultural center housing, among other uses, a 
mosque and an auditorium.2  Burlington Coat Factory abandoned the 
building shortly after September 11, 2001 when the landing gear from a 
plane that struck a World Trade Center tower crashed through its roof.3  
“You’re building over a Christian cemetery!” one sign read.4  A 
supporter of the Muslim center countered, “I say bring it on.  What a 
wonderful opportunity to teach tolerance.”5  In the end, the board had no 
choice but to approve the proposal.6 
A few weeks earlier, with the Statue of Liberty serving as his 
backdrop, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg praised another 
local body, the Landmarks Preservation Commission, for allowing the 
project to advance saying that “we would betray our values if we were to 
treat Muslims differently than anyone else.”7  Among signs that read 
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 1. Megan K. Scott, et al., After Fiery Debate, Vote Approves Mosque Plans, NBC N.Y. (Aug. 
17, 2010, 4:03 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/After-Firey-Debate-Community-
Approves-Mosque-Near-Ground-Zero-94909169.html. 
 2. Emily Geminder, 45 Park Place’s Place, N.Y. OBSERVER, July 20, 2010, 9:25 PM, 
http://www.observer.com/2010/real-estate/45-park-places-place. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Scott et al., supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Michael Barbaro & Javier C. Hernandez, Mosque Plan Clears Hurdle in New York, N.Y. 
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“This mosque celebrates our murders”8 and “Don’t glorify murders of 
3,000,”9 a firefighter injured on September 11 vowed to challenge the 
decision in court.10  Several prominent politicians, including Newt 
Gingrich and Sarah Palin, called the decision offensive.11 
Mayor Bloomberg was likely reflecting his opinion that Muslims 
should be treated the same as members of other faiths, but he may well 
have been expressing relief.  Had either local body rejected Park51, the 
city would have violated the equal-terms provision of the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  The equal-terms 
provision provides, “No government shall impose or implement a land 
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution 
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”12  
In short, the provision attempts to force municipalities to treat religious 
assemblies equally as compared to other assemblies in land-use 
decisions.13 
Three United States Courts of Appeals have produced separate 
tests.14  This Comment will discuss the history of the Free Exercise 
Clause that led to RLUIPA, outline the statute’s structure and function, 
                                                                                                                       
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A1. 
 8. Karina Ioffee, NY Mosque Near September 11 Site Wins Approval, REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2010, 
3:05 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67234X20100803?pageNumber=1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Barbaro & Hernandez, supra note 7, at A1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
 13. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (stating that a church and a community center must be treated equally when they do 
not differ regarding accepted zoning criteria). 
 14. See infra Part III.  The Second and Tenth Circuits have also heard challenges under the 
equal-terms provision, but each resolved the issue without explicitly endorsing a test.  See Third 
Church of Christ, Scientist, of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 2010); Rocky 
Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 978 (2011).  Also, the Ninth Circuit recently decided Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas 
Nuevas v. City of Yuma and virtually adopted the Third Circuit’s test.  No. 09-15422, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14247, at 22–23 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011) (“The city may be able to justify some distinctions 
drawn with respect to churches, if it can demonstrate that the less-than-equal-terms are on account of 
a legitimate regulatory purpose, not the fact that the institution is religious in nature.  In this respect, 
our analysis is about the same as the Third Circuit’s: we look to see if the church is ‘similarly 
situated as to the regulatory purpose.’  The Seventh Circuit, en banc, has refined this test to avoid 
inappropriate subjectivity by requiring equality with respect to ‘accepted zoning criteria,’ such as 
parking, vehicular traffic, and generation of tax revenue.  That refinement is appropriate where 
necessary to prevent evasion of the statutory requirement, though it makes no practical difference in 
this case.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long 
Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 
611 F.3d 367, 373 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). 
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and summarize the circuit split and the tests put forth by the Eleventh, 
Third, and Seventh Circuits.  This Comment will then argue against the 
Eleventh Circuit’s textual interpretation, make the case that such an 
interpretation violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, and  
propose a test combining those used by the Third and Seventh Circuits. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD: RLUIPA, ITS PURPOSE, 
AND ITS REQUIREMENTS 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act grows out 
of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause and, to a lesser extent, its 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.15  This Section will highlight 
RLUIPA’s background, explain its separate provisions and highlight 
their interaction, and explain Congress’s intended role for RLUIPA. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause and the Development of RLUIPA 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains two clauses 
governing state interaction with religion.16  The Free Exercise Clause 
prevents government from hindering a person’s practicing the religion of 
his choosing; the Establishment Clause forbids the government from 
establishing or endorsing a state religion.17  The religion clauses conflict 
with one another.18  The state simultaneously must guarantee individuals 
the ability to practice their religion while avoiding promoting a specific 
religion—or religion generally—too much.19  Somewhere between these 
                                                          
 15. See Bram Alden, Comment, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use Protections 
Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1806 (2010) (stating that RLUIPA’s 
substantial-burdens provision “is somewhat redundant in light of the Free Exercise Clause” and the 
equal-terms provision “is somewhat superfluous in light of the Equal Protection and Establishment 
Clauses”); see also Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning 
Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 930 (2001) (stating that RLUIPA protects land uses in much 
of the same way that they are already protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 17. Id.; see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: 
Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. 
LAW. 195, 196 (2008) (“The religion clauses of the First Amendment . . . simultaneously forbid the 
government from establishing religion and from prohibiting its free exercise . . . .”). 
 18. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (noting that the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause “often exert conflicting pressures”) (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 710, 718 
(2004); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970)). 
 19. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) (“Under the Religion 
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clauses stands the purported wall separating church and state.  But for 
those who point to this wall to justify eliminating religion from public 
life, it will be disappointing to learn that this wall has never been as tall 
or sturdy as they wish.  For example, the reverse side of the Great Seal of 
the United States, above an unfinished pyramid, proclaims the nation’s 
second motto: Annuit Coeptis, which means “God (or Providence) has 
favored our undertakings.”20  Before school each morning, most public 
school children pledge allegiance to the United States as “one nation, 
under God.”21  Thus, it is clear that the state may help—often referred to 
as “accommoda[ting]”22—the free exercise of religion to some degree 
without violating the Establishment Clause.  What is not clear is when 
accommodation morphs into establishment. 
For the past half century, the Supreme Court has engaged in an 
ongoing battle with Congress and state legislatures to determine how 
much a state may accommodate religion under the Free Exercise Clause 
without violating the Establishment Clause.  The legislative bodies have 
consistently increased protection for religious exercise.23  The Supreme 
Court, on the other hand, has actively policed the outer limits of federal 
and state legislative power and reconciled the competing purposes of the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses.24  RLUIPA is just the latest salvo in 
this ongoing and complicated clash as each institution tries to determine 
the proper dimensions of the wall between church and state.25 
The Free Exercise Clause’s modern treatment began in 1963 with the 
landmark case Sherbert v. Verner.26  In Sherbert, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                       
Clauses, government must guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, and must take 
pains not to compel people to act in the name of any religion.”). 
 20. JOHN MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF 
A NATION 81 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the state may 
not compel students to pledge allegiance). 
 22. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. 
 23. See Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1071, 1073, 1076–77 (2009) (highlighting the history of the Free Exercise jurisprudence that led 
to RLUIPA); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714 (“RLUIPA is the latest of long-running congressional 
efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, 
consistent with this Court’s precedents.”). 
 24. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714. 
 25. See id. 
 26. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Comment, Freedom from 
Religion: RLUIPA, Religious Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
571, 578 (2010). 
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applied strict scrutiny to laws that burdened religious exercise.27  Strict 
scrutiny mandates that the government may not substantially burden 
religious exercise unless it can demonstrate that the burden furthers a 
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.28  Typically, courts invalidate laws that are 
subject to strict scrutiny.29  Despite decreeing that it would apply strict 
scrutiny to laws burdening religion, the Court rarely used this test to 
invalidate these laws that hindered religious practice and “generally 
sided with the government when individuals claimed that laws infringed 
their free exercise of religion.”30 
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,31 the Supreme Court 
rejected Sherbert’s rarely used strict scrutiny test for an analysis that 
focused on whether the law was facially neutral and generally 
applicable.32  In Smith, a criminal law prohibited possession of peyote, 
including possession by Native Americans for use during religious 
services.33  The Court declared that the Constitution tolerates laws that 
burden religion so long as those laws are neutral and generally 
applicable; religious observers, just like everyone else, must comply with 
the law.34  “[N]o matter how much a law burdens religious practices, it is 
constitutional . . . so long as it does not single out religious behavior for 
punishment and was not motivated by a desire to interfere with 
religion.”35  Smith is a seminal case, and a major point of contention 
regarding the proper interpretation of the equal-terms provision is how to 
deal with its mandate that cities may pass neutral and generally 
applicable laws that burden religious land use. 
  
                                                          
 27. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–09; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3.2.2, at 1252 (3d ed. 2006). 
 28. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09. 
 29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 9.1.2, at 671. 
 30. Id. § 12.3.1, at 1248. 
 31. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statutes, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (acknowledging that RLUIPA supersedes Smith), and Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated in 
part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
Section 5 powers in enacting RFRA in response to Smith). 
 32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 12.3.1, at 1248. 
 33. 494 U.S. at 874. 
 34. See id. at 890. 
 35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 12.3.1, at 1248. 
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After abandoning the application of strict scrutiny to facially neutral 
and generally applicable laws, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
strict scrutiny should apply to a law that is facially neutral but applied in 
a way that burdens religious exercise.  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the city passed a facially neutral law 
outlawing animal sacrifice after officials learned that followers of the 
Santeria religion, some of whose members engage in ritual animal 
sacrifice, planned to locate in the city.36  The law allowed local officials 
to exempt groups and activities from compliance, and they used this 
power to exempt virtually everyone else in the community from 
complying with the law except the Santeria members.37  The Court 
invalidated the law, holding that a facially neutral law may still face 
strict scrutiny like a non-neutral law, which virtually guarantees that it 
will be struck down, if it purposefully infringes upon a religious practice 
or is implemented in such a way that targets religion.38 
After Smith and Lukumi effectively protected neutral, generally 
applicable laws from strict scrutiny, Congress expressed its disapproval 
of the diminished protection for religious exercise.39  It reacted by 
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 that 
restored strict scrutiny for all laws that substantially burdened religious 
exercise.40  Congress enacted RFRA under its power to remedy state 
violations of constitutional rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In doing so, Congress defined for itself what the Free 
Exercise Clause permits.  Through RFRA, Congress sought to expressly 
overrule Smith41 and decide for itself the amount of protection the 
Constitution should give religious exercise. 
  
                                                          
 36. 508 U.S. 520, 525–28 (1993); see also Minervini, supra note 26, at 579 (citing Lukumi, 508 
U.S. at 525–29, 532). 
 37. 508 U.S. at 536, 543 (discussing the different exemptions the law provided). 
 38. Id. at 533 (stating that “if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because 
of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest” (citation omitted)). 
 39. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 40. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515–16 (reciting RFRA’s requirements). 
 41. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 343–44 (2003) (“From the 
viewpoint of the members of Congress, RFRA was a law aimed at the Supreme Court, with an 
incidental and constitutionally irrelevant effect on the states.”). 
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Four years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court struck 
it down in City of Boerne v. Flores.42  Rebuking Congress for acting 
beyond the scope of its Section 5 powers, the Court stated that “RFRA 
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers 
and the federal balance.”43  RFRA was not merely “remedial, 
preventative legislation” addressing free exercise violations committed 
by the states that the Court had previously recognized.44  Rather, it was 
an attempt “to expand religious liberty and civil rights guarantees beyond 
what the Court interpreted the Constitution to require in Smith.”45  
Congress granted these additional, substantive rights at the expense of 
the states’ ability to legislate in areas traditionally governed by state 
police powers, including local land-use laws.46 
Congress, again, did not take the Court’s reprimand sitting down.  It 
quickly began work on legislation “to enhance the level of protection 
afforded religious freedom.”47  The House Judiciary Committee 
introduced two bills in two consecutive sessions of Congress, each 
entitled the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA).48  RLPA, like 
RFRA, attempted to again reinstate strict scrutiny for all laws burdening 
religious exercise, but Congress used its Article I powers rather than its 
Section 5 powers.49  Each bill stalled in the Senate,50 forcing Congress to 
abandon strict scrutiny as the default test for all laws that burdened free 
exercise.51  But continued lobbying to expand protection in two specific 
areas, religious land uses and religious expression for those held in state 
custody, led to RLPA’s transformation into the more limited and focused 
RLUIPA.52 
  
                                                          
 42. 521 U.S. at 536; see also Campbell, supra note 23, at 1078.  Despite Boerne’s holding, 
RFRA still applies to the federal government.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.2 (2005). 
 43. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 44. Id. at 532. 
 45. Hamilton, supra note 41, at 332. 
 46. Id. at 332–33. 
 47. Michael Paisner, Note, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of Boerne v. 
Flores and the Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 (2005). 
 48. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 49. Hamilton, supra note 41, at 333–34. 
 50. See Kenneth G. Leonczyk, Jr., RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: How a Plain Reading of a 
Flawed Statute Creates an Absurd Result, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 311, 326–27 (2009). 
 51. Paisner, supra note 47, at 543 (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). 
 52. See Hamilton, supra note 41, at 334 (noting the lobbying efforts which transformed RLPA 
into RLUIPA). 
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Thus, RLUIPA targets two areas: laws pertaining to religious land 
uses and laws relating to religious exercise by institutionalized persons.53  
RLUIPA’s land-use provisions are organized into two sections: the 
substantial-burdens section and the discrimination-and-exclusion 
section.54  The substantial-burdens section contains the substantial-
burden provision that states: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, 
assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.55 
The substantial-burden provision is RLUIPA’s strongest protection for 
religious land uses, but is not the subject of this Comment.  The 
substantial-burdens section’s compelling-interest requirement restores 
strict scrutiny for land-use regulations that substantially burden religious 
exercise. 
The discrimination-and-exclusion section contains not only the 
equal-terms provision, but also a nondiscrimination provision that reads, 
“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that 
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion 
or religious denomination.”56  The nondiscrimination provision forbids, 
just as the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses 
already prohibit, “[t]he most invidious form of free exercise violation,” 
which “is discrimination among different religious denominations or 
sects”57 or discrimination based on religion. 
RLUIPA parallels the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence and, considering that Clause’s existing guarantees, 
                                                          
 53. Leonczyk, supra note 50, at 321 (citing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2000)). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 55. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 56. Id. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
 57. Storzer & Picarello, supra note 15, at 972. 
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RLUIPA’s protections are, in many ways, redundant.58  The substantial-
burdens section “enforces the Free Exercise Clause right to be free from 
state action that substantially interferes with the practice of religion 
without compelling justification.”59  The discrimination-and-exclusion 
section attempts to “enforce[] the Free Exercise Clause right to be free 
from state action that discriminates on the basis of religion or religious 
practice, or discriminates among or between religions.”60  Therefore, if a 
nonreligious assembly receives better treatment than a religious entity in 
a land-use decision, the religious entity could file suit alleging violations 
of the Free Exercise Clause, the substantial-burdens provision, the equal-
terms provision, the nondiscrimination provision, and possibly the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simultaneously.  Such 
extensive litigation can be lengthy and costly, and some evidence 
suggests governments simply allow religious assemblies to locate rather 
than fight in court.61 
B. Congressional Intent  
Common land-use tools require local officials—boards, 
commissions, assessors—to make individualized assessments about 
proposed land uses that often allow some uses while denying other, 
similar ones.  Variances allow landowners to escape restrictions if the 
use meets certain criteria.62  Many zoning codes list certain land uses as 
conditional uses, sometimes called special uses.63  These are not 
permitted as a matter of right, but local officials may allow them upon a 
determination that the use would not harm the surrounding area.64  A 
local governing body may amend a zoning law to allow for a use that it 
had previously denied.65  As should be clear, land-use regulation is often  
 
                                                          
 58. Alden, supra note 15, at 1806. 
 59. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 381 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Alden, supra note 15, at 1808–09 (citing Peter Applebome, In the Character of a Village, 
It’s Property vs. Religion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/26/ 
nyregion/26towns.html?scp=1&sq=in%20the%20character%20of%20a%20village&st=cse). 
 62. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 37.03 (2d ed. 2007). 
 63. Id. § 37.04. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 37.02. 
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undertaken on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, granting officials 
considerable discretion to allow and deny uses. 
Congress was concerned that local officials were using this 
discretion to exclude religious land uses while allowing similar, secular 
uses.66  It makes some sense that local officials charged with managing a 
city would not be overly welcoming to churches, synagogues, and other 
houses of worship; these uses are typically not-for-profits, they do not 
generate large numbers of jobs or sales-tax revenue, and they can create 
a lot of traffic.  With RLUIPA’s land-use provisions, Congress intended 
to limit the “highly individualized and discretionary processes” that can 
be used to deny churches the ability to locate in a given district.67  
Congress did not hold new hearings for RLUIPA.68  Instead, it relied on  
the hearings it had held for RLPA where it identified some instances 
where land-use laws burdened religious land use.69 
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA’s 
institutionalized-persons provision against an Establishment Clause 
challenge.70  The Court recognized some accommodation of religion is 
permissible short of an Establishment Clause violation and that “‘there is 
room for play in the joints’” between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause.71  RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision, 
like the substantial-burden provision, codifies strict scrutiny by inserting 
the compelling-interest test.  The applicable provision provides: 
 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the 
                                                          
 66. See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) 
(“Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently 
discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and 
discretionary processes of land use regulation.”); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 15, at 952 
(“RLUIPA merely codifies the First Amendment’s prohibition that the government, where it ‘has in 
place a system of individual exemptions,’ cannot ‘refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious 
hardship’ without compelling reason.’”  (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537, 568 (1993))). 
 67. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000). 
 68. Hamilton, supra note 41, at 334.  Unfortunately, “[t]he hearings for RLPA involving land 
use, which then became the sole legislative history for RLUIPA, did not even as a cursory matter 
take into account the law of land use.”  Id. at 335. 
 69. Id. at 345. 
 70. 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 
U.S. 687, 705 (1994)). 
 71. Id. at 719–20 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
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government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.72 
The institutionalized-persons provision is an accommodation of 
religion because it provides more protection than Smith requires.73  The 
compelling-interest test measures that accommodation against the 
problems that it could cause for prison administrators by giving them 
sufficient leeway to advance the interests of maintaining order in their  
institutions.74  The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality 
of the equal-terms provision. 
III. THE LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF RLUIPA’S EQUAL-
TERMS PROVISION 
The equal-terms provision’s straightforward language belies the 
disparate treatment that three circuit courts of appeals75 have given to its 
terms, procedural history, and conflict with the Establishment Clause.  
The Eleventh Circuit interprets the provision textually and will find a 
                                                          
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006). 
 73. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714.  “RLUIPA is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to 
accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with 
this Court’s precedents.”  Id.  Even so, “the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause does not 
inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general application that incidentally burden religious 
conduct[, and] the political branches could shield religious exercise through legislative 
accommodation.”  Id. (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statutes, 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, 
as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (acknowledging that RLUIPA 
supersedes Smith), and Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–
35 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its Section 5 powers in enacting RFRA in response to 
Smith)). 
 74. Id. at 722. 
 75. The Ninth Circuit ruled shortly before publication of this Comment that it would apply 
basically the same test as the Third Circuit, but would use the Seventh Circuit’s test where 
appropriate.  Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, No. 09-15422, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14247, at *22 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011) (“In this respect, our analysis is about the same 
as the Third Circuit’s: we look to see if the church is ‘similarly situated as to the regulatory 
purpose.’”  (quoting Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
266 (3d Cir. 2007))). 
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violation when a city treats any type of religious land use with any type 
of assembly on less-than-equal terms.76  That violation is then subject to 
strict scrutiny.77  Finding a violation is much harder in the Third and 
Seventh Circuits, but each circuit imposes strict liability, rather than 
strict scrutiny, to violations.78  Though these two circuits’ tests differ 
slightly, at the core of each sits the so-called similarly situated 
requirement.  The similarly situated requirement forces a religious 
assembly to show that it was treated on less-than-equal terms than a 
similar or comparable assembly, not simply any assembly.79  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s textual interpretation is now in jeopardy as circuit and 
district courts around the country see its possible conflict with the 
Establishment Clause and the problems that it causes for municipalities. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit has treated the equal-terms provision with 
considerable depth,80 but no other circuit follows its interpretation.  In 
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, a city ordinance excluded 
churches and synagogues from a business district but allowed private 
social, educational, and recreational nonprofit clubs.81  Two synagogues 
leased space in an area zoned for businesses, but only one applied for a 
special-use permit to use the space for religious purposes.82  The city 
denied the application and sought an injunction against each for the use 
of the spaces as synagogues.83  The city argued that excluding religious 
land uses was necessary to “invigorate the business district” as it was 
crucial to the city’s “tax base, job base, and servicing the needs of 
                                                          
 76. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 
2004).  According to the Eleventh Circuit, the equal-terms provision “lacks the ‘similarly situated’ 
requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”  Id. at 1229 (citing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985)). 
 77. Id. at 1232 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546 (1993)). 
 78. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 (stating that something more than less-than-equal treatment 
is required for a violation); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
370–71 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (taking issue with both the Eleventh and Third Circuit approaches 
and suggesting objective, non-manipulable criteria for evaluating violations). 
 79. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
 80. See Minervini, supra note 26, at 589–90 (explaining that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s 
construction of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision is the most comprehensive we have”). 
 81. 366 F.3d at 1219–20. 
 82. Id. at 1220–21. 
 83. Id. at 1220, 1222. 
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Surfside’s residents.”84  But the Eleventh Circuit found the city ordinance 
violated the equal-terms provision because synagogues and private clubs  
were both assemblies, and the private clubs were allowed while the 
synagogues were not.85 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a strictly textual interpretation and 
incorporated dictionary definitions for the terms “assembly” and 
“institution,” which RLUIPA neglected to define.86  The court defined 
“assembly” as either “‘a company of persons collected together in one 
place [usually] and usually for some common purpose’”87 or, in slightly 
different terms, “‘[a] group of persons organized and united for some 
common purpose.’”88  In the same manner, the court defined “institution” 
as either “‘an established society or corporation: an establishment or 
foundation esp. of a public character’”89 or, similarly, “‘[a]n established 
organization, esp. one of a public character.’”90  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
test to find a violation is essentially two-fold.  First, the court must 
determine if the religious land use “qualifies as an ‘assembly or 
institution.’”91  If it does, then the court must look at the district to see 
“whether the governmental authority treats [the religious land use] 
differently than a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 92  The court 
declined to adopt the similarly situated requirement it identified in the 
Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis and adopted by the 
Third and Seventh Circuits.93  Although the equal-terms provision, the 
court stated, “has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, [the text] lacks the 
‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal protection 
analysis.”94 
Even though strict scrutiny is not mentioned in the equal-terms 
provision, the Eleventh Circuit applies it to violations because that is the 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 1221–22. 
 85. Id. at 1231. 
 86. See id. at 1230–31. 
 87. Id. at 1230 (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 (1993)). 
 88. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 89. Id. at 1230 (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171 (1993)). 
 90. Id. at 1231 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 91. Id. at 1230 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006)). 
 92. Id. (citing § 2000cc(b)(1)). 
 93. See id. at 1230 (discussing the similarly situated requirement relied on by the district court 
and rejecting it). 
 94. Id. at 1229 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985)). 
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level of review imposed on Free Exercise Clause violations.95  Thus, the 
court held that the law at issue in Midrash failed strict scrutiny because it 
was not narrowly tailored to promote its proffered interest.96  
Specifically, the city excluded noneconomic religious assemblies but did 
not exclude noneconomic secular assemblies even though the secular 
assemblies similarly failed to promote “retail synergy.”97  Importantly, 
the Third and the Seventh Circuits would have reached the same result, 
but with a different methodology.98 
Another important Eleventh Circuit case is Konikov v. Orange 
County.99  In Konikov, the plaintiff was a rabbi and the head of a local 
Orthodox Judaism organization.100  He held weekly meetings and Torah 
study in his home. 101  The home was in a residential district that 
permitted, among other uses, family day cares, but required a special-use 
permit for religious uses and day-care centers.102  The county found that 
the use of his house for religious purposes violated the zoning ordinance,  
issued Code Violation Notices, and, ultimately, placed a lien on his 
property.103 
The rabbi argued that the county violated the equal-terms provision 
twice.104  First, he argued that the zoning law facially violated the equal-
terms provision by forcing him to get a permit when other assemblies did 
not need one. 105  The Eleventh Circuit found a potential violation—the 
county allowed day-care centers, which are assemblies, to locate while 
denying the right to religious assemblies.106  But the law did not facially 
violate the equal-terms provision because the violation passed strict  
 
  
                                                          
 95. Id. at 1231–32. 
 96. Id. at 1235. 
 97. See id. (noting that “private clubs and lodges endanger Surfside’s interest in retail synergy 
as much or more than churches and synagogues”). 
 98. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 99. 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 100. Id. at 1320, 1320 n.2 (citing Arthur Green & Shaul Magid, Hasidism: Habad Hasidism, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005)). 
 101. Id. at 1320. 
 102. Id. (noting that “family day care operations” and “day care centers” are not the same under 
the challenged ordinance). 
 103. Id. at 1320–21. 
 104. Id. at 1324. 
 105. Id. at 1324–27. 
 106. Id. at 1326–27. 
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scrutiny—it was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling 
government interest of “protecting choice in the context of the family.”107 
Second, the rabbi argued that if the law was facially neutral, it 
nonetheless violated the equal-terms provision as applied to him because 
the county selectively enforced it against religious meeting places but not 
against secular meeting places.108  The court agreed.109  The law 
distinguished between social or family purposes, on the one hand, and 
religious purposes on the other.110  Cub scouts or dinner groups that met 
with the same frequency and number of attendees as the rabbi’s religious 
meetings would be allowed, while the rabbi’s gatherings would not be.111  
The court held that because the only difference between allowed and 
disallowed uses was the religious motivation, the code targeted religious 
land uses as applied to the rabbi.112 
The rabbi could have pursued remuneration under the Equal 
Protection Clause if he could show the discrimination was intentional.113  
The main difference, it seems, between the Equal Protection Clause and 
equal-terms provision is that the equal-terms provision can be invoked 
even if the discrimination is not intentional.114  But when a plaintiff 
“produce[s] enough evidence to establish that a similarly situated secular 
institution has been treated more favorably under RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision, such evidence would provide strong support to an intentional 
discrimination allegation under the Equal Protection Clause.”115 
In Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward 
County,116 the Eleventh Circuit expanded and clarified its jurisprudence 
relating to the equal-terms provision.117  The court identified three 
possible ways the equal-terms provision can be violated.  First, a law 
may facially discriminate between religious and nonreligious 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 1327. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1329. 
 110. Id. at 1328. 
 111. Id. at 1328–29. 
 112. Id. at 1329. 
 113. See Alden, supra note 15, at 1806–07 (discussing the similarity of challenges under the 
equal-terms provision and the Equal Protection Clause) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
240 (1976); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1807 (footnote omitted). 
 116. 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 117. See Minervini, supra note 26, at 588–90 (noting that religious entities should be given equal 
treatment under RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision). 
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assemblies.118  This situation arose in Midrash when the city facially 
violated the equal-terms provision by excluding churches and 
synagogues but not private social clubs.119  Second, a facially neutral law 
can be drafted purposefully and carefully to burden only religious 
assemblies and institutions.120  This is commonly referred to as 
gerrymandering, and had the equal-terms provision been around when 
Lukumi was decided, that ordinance would have resulted in a violation of 
this manner.121  Third, a facially neutral statute can be selectively and 
discriminatorily applied so as to target a religious assembly or conduct 
while exempting nonreligious ones.122  Under this option, the Eleventh 
Circuit requires that the plaintiff show that a similarly situated 
nonreligious assembly received different treatment under the law at 
issue.123  This type of violation arose in Konikov when the city 
discriminatorily applied a facially neutral zoning code to keep religious 
assemblies out of the district while allowing similar secular 
assemblies.124 
B. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit disavowed the Eleventh Circuit’s textual approach 
and became the first circuit to make the case for the similarly situated 
requirement.  In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long 
Branch, a city excluded religious uses from its downtown commercial 
district, but it allowed, among other uses, assembly halls in the district.125  
The church purchased property and applied for a zoning permit to use its 
property for religious purposes; the city denied the application.126  The 
church then sued the city, alleging a number of constitutional violations 
as well as violations of the equal-terms and substantial-burdens 
provisions.127  The church lost at the district court level.128  But as that 
                                                          
 118. Primera, 450 F.3d at 1308. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 81–97. 
 120. Primera, 450 F.3d at 1308. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 122. Primera, 450 F.3d at 1308. 
 123. Id. at 1311 (citing Konikov v. Orange Cty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 
curiam); Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 99–115. 
 125. 510 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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litigation made its way through the appellate courts, the city amended the 
zoning code at issue in the pending litigation.129  It adopted a 
redevelopment plan that de-listed assembly halls as a permitted use, 
continued to deny religious land uses, and prohibited any new use not 
specifically listed.130  The redevelopment plan’s regulatory purpose was 
to create a “‘vibrant’ and ‘vital’ downtown residential community” out of 
the “‘underdeveloped and underutilized’” commercial district in order to 
strengthen trade, increase revenues, and create jobs by attracting 
business.131 
The Third Circuit divided its analysis into post-amendment and pre-
amendment periods.  The court upheld the church’s exclusion from the 
district after the amendment was enacted because the church was “not 
similarly situated to the other allowed assemblies with respect to the 
aims of the Plan.”132  The assemblies allowed in the district after the 
amendment—theaters, cinemas, arts centers, and others that generate 
income and encourage foot traffic133—did not negatively impact the 
district’s economic revitalization as a church would.134 
Though the city’s post-amendment plan did not violate the equal-
terms provision, its pre-amendment plan did.135  By permitting assembly 
halls and denying churches, the city treated a religious assembly on less-
than-equal terms with another assembly that similarly affected the 
district’s regulatory purpose; this violates the equal-terms provision for 
two reasons.136  First, the city did not provide a regulatory purpose for 
the district before the amendment, so there was no way for the court to 
determine how each assembly would affect the district.137  Second, and 
most importantly, even if there had been a stated regulatory purpose, the 
city would be unable to show “why a church would cause greater harm to  
regulatory objectives than an ‘assembly hall’ that could be used for 
unspecified meetings.”138 
                                                                                                                       
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 258. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (quoting the Broadway Redevelopment Plan). 
 132. Id. at 270. 
 133. Id. at 272. 
 134. Id. at 270–71. 
 135. Id. at 272–73. 
 136. Id. at 272. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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The Third Circuit adopted the similarly situated requirement because 
it felt using the requirement was the best way to fulfill Congress’s intent 
to incorporate the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence 
into RLUIPA.139  After examining key Supreme Court cases as well as its 
own past cases, the court declared that under free exercise jurisprudence 
“[t]he impact of the allowed and forbidden behaviors must be examined 
in light of the purpose of the regulation.”140  A neutral and generally 
applicable law, and thus permissible under Smith, does not become 
presumptively invalid “simply because it allows certain secular behaviors 
but not certain religious behaviors.”141  Additionally, if the “government 
permits secular exemptions to an otherwise generally applicable 
government regulation, the Free Exercise Clause requires that the 
government accord equal treatment to religion-based claims for 
exemptions that would have a similar impact on the protected 
interests.”142  The court discussed Lukumi when justifying its conclusion 
that Free Exercise violations “hinge[] on a comparison of how it treats 
entities or behavior that have the same effect on its objectives.”143  The 
law in Lukumi did not fail simply because it allowed animal slaughter for 
secular reasons but not for religious reasons.  Rather, it failed because 
both religious and secular slaughter affected the city’s regulatory goals in 
the same way, yet the city treated the two behaviors differently.144  Such 
“unequal treatment of equally detrimental behaviors is what caused the 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.”145  Thus, the proper comparison 
for the Third Circuit is not between all religious assemblies and all 
secular assemblies regardless of their differences.  Instead, the proper 
approach compares a religious assembly and an analogous secular 
assembly that similarly impact a regulation’s aims.146 
                                                          
 139. See id. at 264–68 (discussing the Free Exercise Clause’s interplay with RLUIPA). 
 140. Id. at 265. 
 141. Id. at 264–65 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statutes, 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, 
as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (acknowledging that RLUIPA 
supersedes Smith), and Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–
35 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its Section 5 powers in enacting RFRA in response to 
Smith)). 
 142. Id. at 265. 
 143. Id. at 264–65. 
 144. Id. at 265. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 266. 
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The court further recognized that a broad, textual interpretation 
greatly interferes with local development.  Here, a New Jersey state law 
prohibited liquor sales within 200 feet of religious assemblies.147  Even if 
the church agreed to waive its right to enforce the statute in this 
particular instance, the church would still retain discretion to enforce the 
statute against subsequent new licensees.148  This gives churches de facto 
veto power over new assemblies and undue control over the new 
entertainment district.149 
In dissent, Judge Jordan criticized the similarly situated 
requirement.150  Judge Jordan noted that Congress did not include it in 
the plain text of the statute.151  He further argued that RLUIPA is not an 
attempt to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, which contains the 
similarly situated requirement, but rather the Free Exercise Clause, and 
grafting such a requirement onto the statute frustrates Congress’s 
purpose.152 
Two other courts that have seemingly adopted the Third Circuit’s 
test deserve treatment.  The Tenth Circuit has not explicitly outlined or 
adopted a test to interpret the equal-terms provision.  But in Rocky 
Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County Commissioners, a panel 
of the Tenth Circuit did not rebuke the district court for using the 
similarly situated requirement.153  The court decided the case using 
traditional Free Exercise Clause principles because the zoning law was 
“discriminatorily applied” to target the church.154  Whether this failure to  
criticize the district court will translate into an adoption of the similarly 
situated requirement remains to be seen. 
In Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, Judge 
Wake of the District of Arizona adopted the Third Circuit’s test and 
effectively held that Smith provides an affirmative defense for 
disallowing a religious land use based upon a neutral and generally 
                                                          
 147. Id. at 270 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-76 (West 1994)). 
 148. Id. at 271. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 292–93 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 293 (citing Vision Church United Methodist v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 
1002–03 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See 613 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the district court properly instructed 
the jury that RMCC must establish ‘that [the County] treated [RMCC] less favorably . . . than [the 
County] treated a similarly situated nonreligious assembly or institution’” (alterations in original)). 
 154. Id. at 1237–38. 
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applicable law.155  “A zoning ordinance does not violate the equal terms 
provision, even if it permits some secular assemblies or institutions and 
excludes religious assemblies or institutions, so long as there is a neutral 
and generally applicable principle for doing so.”156  Judge Wake felt that 
“Congress codified but did not exceed free exercise principles.”157  In 
contrast, the substantial-burdens provision does exceed free exercise 
principles, and should be considered an accommodation, because it 
subjects a category of laws that had previously not been subject to strict 
scrutiny under Smith to strict scrutiny. 
C. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit cited the Eleventh Circuit without criticism until 
July 2010.158  But, as if outlining and analyzing this statute was not 
complicated enough, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner 
who had previously authored decisions favorably citing the Eleventh 
Circuit but without fully adopting its analysis,159 announced its own test.  
In an en banc hearing, the Seventh Circuit adopted the similarly situated 
requirement but shifted its focus from a district’s regulatory purpose to a 
district’s regulatory criteria.160  In River of Life, a small church wanted to 
relocate into a city’s dilapidated downtown, which was zoned as a 
commercial district that excluded any new, noncommercial uses to 
encourage revitalization.161  When the city denied its entry, the church 
sued.162  The district court refused to enjoin enforcement of the zoning 
ordinance because the law treated similar assemblies—both the church 
and other new, noncommercial assemblies such as libraries and  
 
                                                          
 155. 615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995–96 (D. Ariz. 2010), rev’d, No. 09-15422, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14247 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011). 
 156. Id. at 996. 
 157. Id. at 995 (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 
F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 158. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (noting that the court “had cited Midrash without criticism but had not been centrally 
concerned with the interpretive issue presented in this case”). 
 159. See Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227–31 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 160. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371 (stating that the equal-terms provision was imperfectly 
realized by the Third Circuit). 
 161. Id. at 368. 
 162. Id. 
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community centers—the same in relation to the regulatory criteria of the 
district.163 
The Seventh Circuit felt Congress’s overriding goal for the equal-
terms provision was to promote equality between religious and 
nonreligious land uses.164  Equality, Judge Posner wrote, “except when 
used of mathematical or scientific relations, signifies not equivalence or 
identity but proper relation to relevant concerns.”165  The equal-terms 
provision best fulfills its objective if it compares the city’s treatment of 
different assemblies in relation to the district’s objective and well-
publicized zoning criteria—commercial, residential, industrial, or some 
combination of the three—rather than a dictionary definition or a 
regulatory purpose that can be manipulated by local officials more easily 
than zoning criteria.166 
The Seventh Circuit discussed the importance of zoning and land-use 
regulations at length.  Segregating uses, the court observed, allows 
officials to create separate areas of a city “‘to [e]nsure a better and more 
economical use of municipal services, such as schools, providing police 
protection, preventing and fighting fires, and better use of street 
facilities.’”167  The city has every right to designate different areas for 
different uses to promote the general welfare, encourage rational 
development, and, ultimately, create safe cities.168  Not surprisingly, the 
Seventh Circuit’s test reflects this deference. 
In dissent, Judge Sykes forcefully advocated for a textual 
interpretation169 with a slight alteration in the definition of assembly.170  
She disagreed that any similarly situated requirement exists in the 
Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, contending that the 
requirement is only a way to “ferret[] out” discriminatory intent from 
equal protection jurisprudence.171  To mollify concerns over a broad 
definition, she pressed for a nuanced definition of assembly.172  Bars, 
                                                          
 163. Id. at 373. 
 164. Id. at 371. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 371–74. 
 167. Id. at 372 (quoting People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Vill. of Morton 
Grove, 157 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. 1959)). 
 168. See id. at 371–73. 
 169. Id. at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 389. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at 389–90 (contrasting the common understanding of “assembly” and dictionary 
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restaurants, health clubs, and other assemblies whose primary use is not 
simply to gather but to gather and perform another act—like having a 
drink or eating a meal—should not be considered assemblies for 
purposes of the equal-terms provision.173  Even though people “assemble 
for a common purpose” at these places, each lacks a “degree of group 
affinity, organization, and unity around a common purpose.”174  This 
definition would lessen the number of comparators for a church to use, 
and, presumably, the test would find fewer violations. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
Each test will reach similar conclusions in run-of-the-mill cases 
disputing the equal-terms provision, but the test matters greatly in the 
borderline cases.  All equal-terms provision tests are broken into two 
sections: the identification of a violation and the determination of the 
level of scrutiny to which the violation is subject.  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach—a textual interpretation of the violation and application of 
strict scrutiny to allow the government to escape the provision’s 
mandates175—may be the most workable test in practice.  Allowing a 
textual interpretation to control is usually preferred.  Also, it makes sense 
to conclude that since strict scrutiny is applied to free exercise 
challenges, it should apply to RLUIPA provisions as well.  
Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit’s test simply does not do justice to 
the statute and will result in bizarre and unintended outcomes.  This 
Section highlights three important cases and contends that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s interpretation facially violates the Establishment Clause and 
will likely result in a successful as-applied challenge as well.  Because 
the Eleventh Circuit’s textual interpretation does not account for the 
burdens on nonbeneficiaries and improperly relies on strict scrutiny to 
save it, this test should be avoided in favor of the other tests that adopt 
the similarly situated requirement.  Finally, this Section proposes 
merging the Third and Seventh Circuit tests. 
                                                                                                                       
definitions of “assembly”). 
 173. See id. at 390. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See generally supra Part III.A. 
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A. The Eleventh Circuit’s Textual Interpretation Results in a Facial 
Violation of the Establishment Clause 
Through RLUIPA’s land-use provisions, Congress intended to 
“enforce the Free Exercise Clause rule against laws that burden religion 
and are not neutral and generally applicable.”176  Codification of rules 
laid out in Supreme Court cases are not usually subject to successful 
constitutional challenges because they are considered “‘federal 
enforcements of federal rights.’”177  But the Eleventh Circuit’s test does 
not simply codify existing guarantees.  A textual interpretation extends 
protection beyond the bounds of free exercise rules and is therefore 
subject to a constitutional challenge.  If the equal-terms provision 
codified the line of cases outlined in Part II,178 then cities would have an 
affirmative defense based on Smith—that is, a city could exclude a 
church or synagogue if it had a neutral and generally applicable reason 
for doing so.  Without the equal-terms provision and RLUIPA’s other 
land-use provisions, a religious assembly does not have an independent 
right to locate in a district that excludes it with a facially neutral and 
generally applicable zoning ordinance.179 
The Eleventh Circuit’s test is inconsistent with this approach.  For 
example, if a city’s redevelopment plan excludes any new, 
noncommercial uses to promote economic revitalization, as was the case 
in Lighthouse,180 but an existing school is located in the district, then the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach would allow a church and disallow a similar, 
secular use.  A textual interpretation defeats the neutral and generally 
applicable law.  Therefore, the argument that the equal-terms provision 
cannot be unconstitutional because it is just legislative enactment of free 
exercise rules laid out by the Supreme Court must fail because a textual 
interpretation actually defeats Smith’s holding. 
  
                                                          
 176. 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).  “Sections 
2(b)(1) and (2) prohibit various forms of discrimination against or among religious land uses.”  Id.; 
see supra Part II.A. 
 177. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 17, at 215 (quoting United States v. Maui Cnty., 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 1010, 1015 (D. Haw. 2003)). 
 178. See supra Part II.A. 
 179. Judge Wake made this point in Centro Familiar discussed in Part III.B.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 155–56. 
 180. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
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The fact that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation extends protection 
beyond what has previously been allowed does not render the 
interpretation per se invalid in the slightest.  Instead, the focus must shift 
to determine if a textual interpretation is a valid accommodation of 
religion beyond what the Free Exercise Clause requires but still short of 
what the Establishment Clause forbids.  This Section argues that it is not. 
The Supreme Court declared that RLUIPA is an attempt by Congress 
to accommodate religious practice beyond traditional free exercise 
principles but short of an unconstitutional endorsement.181  To pass 
muster, the accommodation must be neutral towards religion and may 
not “favor religion over secularism or one religion over others.”182  The 
essential test is whether the law simply accommodates religious exercise 
or, instead, favors religion to the point of a symbolic endorsement of 
religion over secularism.183  The Supreme Court has employed the 
“accommodation versus endorsement” test in a few important cases, but 
the context differed in each.184 
In Cutter, RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision faced an 
Establishment Clause challenge.185  This provision prohibits states from 
imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise of those held in state 
custody “unless the burden furthers ‘a compelling governmental 
interest,’ and does so by ‘the least restrictive means.’”186  This so-called 
                                                          
 181. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
 182. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 12.2.1, at 1193.  There is no reason to think that RLUIPA 
will favor one religion over another because the statute makes no mention of specific religions, just 
religion in general. 
 183. See id. § 12.2.1, at 1193–96.  “Under [the neutrality theory] approach, the government 
violates the establishment clause if it symbolically endorses a particular religion or if it generally 
endorses either religion or secularism.”  Id. § 12.2.1, at 1194.  The Court will likely employ the 
neutrality theory because it did so in Cutter.  See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (stating the constitution 
obligates “neutrality” (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 184. The Court will not employ the Lemon Test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
612–13 (1971).  Because it declined to use Lemon to evaluate one section of RLUIPA, it will likely 
not employ it to evaluate another section of the same statute.  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717–18 n.6.  Two 
cases, however, both cited in Cutter, do rely on Lemon’s second prong—declaring that a law’s 
principal or primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion—to evaluate whether an 
accommodation violates the Establishment Clause.  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (citing Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)); 
id. at 720 (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)).  In any event, these tests 
are virtually the same: the law “must not symbolically endorse religion or a particular religion.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 12.2.3, at 1204 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249–53 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
 185. 544 U.S. at 713. 
 186. Id. at 712 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (2006)). 
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compelling-interest test simply recodifies strict scrutiny for laws in this 
area.  Laws that “alleviate[] exceptional government-created burdens on 
private religious exercise” will often result in a ruling that they 
accommodate and do not endorse.187  The provision accomplished just 
this while accounting for the burdens it placed on the law’s 
nonbeneficiaries so that it “[did] not override other significant 
interests.”188  For example, if allowing a Catholic inmate access to 
sacramental wine189 or providing sack lunches to Jewish or Muslim 
inmates to break a fast after nightfall190 would result in legitimate 
security concerns for the institution, then prison officials need not 
accommodate the prisoner’s religious practice.191  The law helps religion, 
but not at the complete expense of prison officials’ ability to manage an 
institution. 
The law at issue in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., however, did 
not toe this line as gingerly.192  In Thornton, a Connecticut law 
guaranteed every employee the right to take the day off of work on 
whatever day the employee decreed was his Sabbath.193  This 
accommodation violated the Establishment Clause because it advanced 
religion over all other interests.194  The law failed to account for the 
burdens it placed on its nonbeneficiaries—the employers and other 
employees—who were forced to conform to the religious practice 
without exception.195 
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, a section of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act exempted secular activities of religious organizations, such as 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 720 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 
(1994)). 
 188. Id. at 722. 
 189. Id. at 716 n.5 (citing Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58–59 (1998) 
(prepared statement of Donald W. Brooks, Reverend, Diocese of Tulsa, Okla.)). 
 190. Id. (citing Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 39 (1998) (statement 
of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Dir. of Legal Affairs, Aleph Inst.)). 
 191. Id. at 725. 
 192. 472 U.S. 703, 708–09 (1985). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 709–11. 
 195. See id. at 708–09 (“The State has thus decreed that those who observe a Sabbath any day of 
the week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work on that day, no 
matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers.”). 
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church-affiliated nonprofits, from the prohibition against discrimination 
in employment based on religion.196  The exemption was a permissible 
legislative accommodation because it “alleviate[d] significant 
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to 
define and carry out their religious missions.”197  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the exemption burdened 
employees because the exemption justified discrimination if an employee 
failed to conform to the organization’s religious practices and beliefs.198  
But in this “confrontation between the rights of religious organizations 
and those of individuals,”199 the ability of the religious organization to 
define and carry out its mission trumped the burden on the individual.200  
Had the Court ruled differently, it would have effectively mandated the 
hiring practices of religious organizations and thus violated one of the  
Court’s primary goals of the Free Exercise Clause—noninterference with 
the religious beliefs of Americans.201 
Though each of these cases is different, rules governing the 
permissible scope of an accommodation are relatively clear.  
Government has more leeway to accommodate religion when alleviating 
government-created burdens—such as, for example, exempting religion 
from compliance with otherwise valid laws—than when it simply 
provides religion with an outright benefit.202  But an accommodation that 
fails to account for its impact on those that do not benefit from the law 
will “founder on [the] shoals” of the Court’s previous decisions and 
violate the Establishment Clause by advancing religion over all other 
interests.203 
RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision fits within the hazy, 
gray interior between the First Amendment’s religious clauses because it 
alleviates government-created burdens while accounting for the law’s 
                                                          
 196. 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987). 
 197. Id. at 335. 
 198. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 342–43. 
 201. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
 202. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, § 12.2.3, at 1205 (“The difference between Thornton and 
Amos is that the latter involved an exemption . . . whereas the former . . . provided a benefit . . . .  
The Court found that the latter was permissible, but that the former was the government advancing 
religion through its own activities and influence.”). 
 203. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. 
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burdens on its nonbeneficiaries.204  The Eleventh Circuit’s textual 
interpretation of the equal-terms provision, however, does not meet this 
test.  Although it alleviates government-created burdens, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s test fails to account for the burdens it places on 
nonbeneficiaries because cities and municipalities cannot escape its 
requirements even when there are valid reasons to exclude them.  
Without the “‘strict scrutiny’ gloss” that the Eleventh Circuit adds to its 
interpretation,205 its test is dangerously reminiscent of that used by the 
Thornton Court to strike down a law that singled out religious practices 
for a benefit without considering the law’s effect on employers.206  In 
Midrash, where the Eleventh Circuit outlined its test, the court 
completely overlooked the requirement that an ordinance providing 
accommodations must account for its burdens and, rather, relied only on 
the fact that the government may help religious organizations advance 
religion by alleviating burdens.207 
The Eleventh Circuit and supporters of its interpretation will contend 
that because it subjects violations to strict scrutiny, which allows a 
government to justify the violation, it clearly accounts for the law’s 
burdens and brings the law squarely into the area between the religious 
clauses.  But the problem with that argument is that strict scrutiny is 
itself improper.  Since strict scrutiny is the only way the test accounts for 
its burdens, its removal renders the entire test invalid. 
Substantively, strict scrutiny is unnecessary for two reasons.  First, 
the equal-terms provision is a different creature than either the 
institutionalized-persons provision or the substantial-burdens provision.  
It does not grow specifically out of the Smith, Lukumi, and City of 
Boerne Free Exercise Clause line of cases as provisions that reinstate 
strict scrutiny do; it is a wholly new creation provided as an additional 
and complementary protection to RLUIPA’s substantial-burdens 
provision.  Because it is a new creation, the text simply does not contain 
strict scrutiny208—the central aspect of the battle between Congress and 
the Court from that line of cases. 
                                                          
 204. Id. (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). 
 205. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (commenting on the Eleventh Circuit’s approach); see also infra notes 208–10 and 
accompanying text (arguing strict scrutiny is improper). 
 206. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 708–09. 
 207. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 208. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71. 
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Second, statutes must be read as a whole, and RLUIPA’s structure 
shows that Congress did not intend for strict scrutiny anywhere in the 
application of the equal-terms provision.  As shown above, Congress 
codified strict scrutiny in two other places within the same statute but 
explicitly declined to do so in the equal-terms provision.  In fact, the 
substantial-burdens provision should be considered the focal point of the 
land-use section since it was over this provision that the Supreme Court 
and Congress fought, and any violation of the equal-terms provision will 
also amount to a substantial burden.  This lends support to the conclusion 
that Congress did not want strict scrutiny for equal-terms violations.209 
Critics should question the rationale behind adopting the similarly 
situated analysis from outside the text and rejecting strict scrutiny.  
Again, the fact that Congress chose not to include strict scrutiny within 
the equal-terms provision speaks volumes.  It had been engaged in a 
highly lobbied,210 fifty-year struggle with the Supreme Court concerning 
strict scrutiny and easily could have included it throughout the statute if 
it wanted.  Further, the similarly situated requirement mimics strict 
scrutiny by examining whether the law is narrowly tailored.  Similarly 
situated analysis, just like narrowly tailored analysis, examines whether 
the law affects religious and nonreligious assemblies equally in relation 
to its goal. 
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Textual Interpretation May Result in an As-
Applied Violation of the Establishment Clause 
The analysis above contends that the Eleventh Circuit’s textual 
interpretation of the equal-terms provision may facially violate the 
Establishment Clause.  But this is not the only way the equal-terms 
provision may run afoul of the Establishment Clause.  The large number 
of land-use devices makes an as-applied Establishment Clause challenge 
unavoidable.  It is easy to imagine a situation in which a textual approach 
would lead to an as-applied Establishment Clause violation, while a test 
                                                          
 209. Matthias Kleinsasser, Note, RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision and the Split Between the 
Eleventh and Third Circuits, 29 REV. LITIG. 163, 173 (2009) (“Noting that RLUIPA’s Substantial 
Burdens section codifies strict scrutiny by its plain language while the Discrimination and Exclusion 
section does not, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to incorporate strict scrutiny into 
the Equal Terms provision.”  (citing Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 
510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007))). 
 210. See Hamilton, supra note 41, at 334 (noting the activities of a number of groups lobbying 
for and against RLPA). 
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incorporating the similarly situated requirement would not.  For example, 
imagine that Imaginary City zoned an area as strictly commercial and did 
not allow any noncommercial uses.  The regulatory purpose is to increase 
tax revenues and encourage foot traffic for businesses.  Two entities—a 
small church and a small, secular nonprofit—apply for a special-use 
permit to allow for noncommercial uses.  Both organizations are tax-free 
entities that create no jobs, generate no foot traffic, and attract the same 
number of people.  A movie theater and a bowling alley are currently 
located in the zone and classify as assemblies under a textual 
interpretation because each falls within the dictionary definition of a 
place where people “‘collect[] together in one place . . . for some 
common purpose.’”211 
If Imaginary City were in the Eleventh Circuit, the city would be 
forced to welcome the church, but it would still be free to exclude the 
nonprofit.  Further, even if the Eleventh Circuit keeps strict scrutiny, it is 
unlikely that “promoting economic development” would suffice as a 
compelling interest.212  The Eleventh Circuit, in essence, requires the city 
to prioritize the church over both its developmental priorities and secular 
land uses. 
If Imaginary City were in the Third or Seventh Circuits, the result 
would be different.  Both entities could properly be denied.  The Third 
Circuit would permit denial because neither organization generates tax 
revenue or foot traffic.  The Seventh Circuit would likewise permit 
denial because neither organization is a commercial organization, and 
only commercial organizations are allowed.  Either test accounts for the 
burdens on the locality and treats similar organizations equally.  In his 
concurring opinion in River of Life, however, Judge Manion took issue 
with this argument.  He stated the “government may grant exemptions to 
religious observers without violating the Establishment Clause.”213  This 
is surely true.  The ability for governments to choose to grant 
exemptions, however, is wholly different than Congress forcing a 
municipality to grant exemptions for religious land uses while denying 
similarly situated secular land uses.  In fact, such treatment may even 
                                                          
 211. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230 (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 
131 (1993)). 
 212. See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 15, at 962–67 (discussing trends in the identification 
and recognition of “compelling interests”). 
 213. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 376 (Manion, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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give the similarly situated secular assembly grounds to sue under an 
Equal Protection Clause theory if it can show that a distinction between 
religious uses and nonreligious uses invokes a suspect classification.214 
C. The Case for Avoiding a Textual Interpretation 
After concluding that a textual interpretation of the equal-terms 
provision will, in the least, conflict with the Establishment Clause and, at 
the most, result in its invalidation, the remaining question considers the 
appropriate interpretation of the provision.  “‘The cardinal principle of 
statutory construction . . . is to save and not to destroy.’”215  Since before 
Marbury v. Madison,216 courts have employed the avoidance canon, 
called “the preeminent canon of federal statutory construction” by one 
commentator, to save statutes from unconstitutionality by choosing to 
interpret their terms in such a way so as to prevent conflicts with this 
nation’s bedrock principles.217  A court need not conclude that a broader 
reading in fact violates the Constitution before avoiding the broader 
interpretation; it must only find that a broader reading could possibly be 
unconstitutional.218  The avoidance canon is a tool to help courts decide  
between competing interpretations of a statutory text when both of which 
are fairly possible and one of which may violate the Constitution.219 
In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court summarized the modern 
avoidance canon and when to employ it: 
First, as a general matter, when a particular interpretation of a statute 
invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear 
indication that Congress intended that result.  Second, if an otherwise 
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is 
“fairly possible,” we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such 
problems.220 
                                                          
 214. See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 15, at 981–82 (noting “the Equal Protection prohibitions 
against treating similarly situated parties differently”). 
 215. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1945 (1997) (quoting NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)). 
 216. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 217. Vermeule, supra note 215, at 1948–49. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1333 (2010) (citing 
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005)). 
 220. 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (citations omitted) (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. 
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A broad textual interpretation of the equal-terms provision reaches the 
outer limits of Congress’s power.221  First, as shown above in Part IV.A–
B, a textual approach may not survive an Establishment Clause 
challenge.  Even if it does survive, there is no doubt that it will force the 
Supreme Court into a difficult and relatively arbitrary line-drawing 
exercise over the scope of Congress’s power in the nether regions 
between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.  Second, 
although Cutter upheld RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision as 
within the scope of Congress’s Section 5 powers,222 the equal-terms 
provision represents a serious intrusion into an area traditionally 
occupied by state government.  Congressional oversight of local land-use 
decisions is substantially different than the exemption from federal law 
granted to religious organizations in Amos.223  “[L]and use was one of the 
last bastions of true local control and one of the primary means by which 
communities shape their character and serve collective needs.”224  One 
alteration in a land-use regulation or granting of a conditional-use permit 
can alter the character of a neighborhood or purposes of a district.225 
One needs to look no further than Bellmore, New York to see how 
an overly aggressive equal-terms provision could affect a neighborhood.  
After a church was allowed to locate in one of Bellmore’s residential 
districts, it quickly expanded its offerings.226  The church grew from a 
simple church to a mini-compound, providing at times boarding services, 
driver’s education, and a café.227  Though these are noble services that 
surely help the church members, they also affected the neighborhood 
residents or—in the parlance of the Establishment Clause—the equal-
terms provision’s nonbeneficiaries.  Property values depreciated as the 
church’s informal twelve-car parking lot backed up to surrounding 
                                                                                                                       
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 
288, 341, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); 
United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). 
 221. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 222. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–24 (2005). 
 223. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (granting an exemption to churches in order to alleviate a 
government-created burden). 
 224. Hamilton, supra note 41, at 355. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Matthew Hogan, Walk in Love Church Sparks Protest, BELLMOREPATCH (N.Y.), (Oct. 8, 
2010), http://bellmore.patch.com/articles/walk-in-love-church-sparks-protest. 
 227. Id. 
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yards.228  Certainly, religious land uses deserve protection, which they 
receive from the Free Exercise Clause, the substantial-burdens provision, 
and a narrower, but still powerful, equal-terms provision.  But it must be 
recognized that there are serious societal costs to granting exceptions to  
religious assemblies that provide numerous different services in areas 
where local officials already decided the use would harm the area. 
After concluding that the broad interpretation reaches the limits of 
Congress’s power because of the conflict with the Establishment Clause 
and the intrusion onto the functions of state governments, the second half 
of the avoidance test asks if another, narrower reading is fairly 
possible.229  Here, the interpretations by both the Third and Seventh 
Circuits are well-reasoned.  All three circuits agree that Congress 
intended to codify the Free Exercise Clause into the equal-terms 
provision to some degree.230  The circuits also likely agree that the goal 
of the equal-terms provision is to guarantee equality between religious 
and nonreligious assemblies in land-use decisions.  Two circuits 
apparently felt that the best way to accomplish these goals was through 
the similarly situated requirement.231 
Lastly, although Congress intended for a broad interpretation, it did 
not clearly intend for the broader textual interpretation.  Conversely, the 
narrow interpretation is not expressly against Congress’s intent.  In fact, 
adopting a similarly situated requirement and strict liability better fulfills 
Congress’s intent.  Not only does it limit local officials’ discretion while 
increasing protection for religious land uses, it also prevents some of the 
bizarre occurrences that a broad, textual interpretation would lead to and 
renders the equal-terms provision immune from Establishment Clause 
challenges.  For instance, under a strictly textual approach, it may be 
difficult to create entertainment districts lined with bars and restaurants 
to rejuvenate a district because a church would also have the option of 
                                                          
 228. Id. 
 229. See text accompanying note 219. 
 230. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“If we’re right that section 2000cc(a)(1) of RLUIPA codifies Sherbert v. Verner, there isn’t much 
point to a plaintiff’s adding a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Sherbert-type violation of the 
free exercise clause . . . .”); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 
253, 264 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is undisputed that, when drafting the Equal Terms provision, Congress 
intended to codify the existing jurisprudence interpreting the Free Exercise Clause.”); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (“RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision codifies the Smith–Lukumi line of precedent.”). 
 231. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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locating in such a district.  At last count, nineteen states bar the issuance 
of liquor licenses to businesses located near churches232 and fifteen states 
leave the option to localities to do the same.233  Unless the Eleventh 
Circuit takes the advice from Judge Sykes of the Seventh Circuit by 
modifying the strict dictionary definition of the term assembly,234 any bar 
with a separate room for parties or meetings would fall within the 
dictionary definition of assembly.  As was the case with Lighthouse in 
the Third District, allowing a church into a new bar district would give 
the church significant power over the city’s developmental priorities.235  
Religious assemblies with moral objections to activities that typically 
occur in bar districts—drinking and, possibly, gambling—could thus 
locate in the district and thwart its development. 
Another example of a bizarre result that is against the express will of 
Congress comes from an oft-cited example in Lighthouse: “[I]f a town 
allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the senior center, it must 
also permit a large church with a thousand members . . . to locate in the 
same neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity might 
have on the envisioned character of the area.”236  Because a secular 
assembly is located in the district, then a church must be allowed as well 
no matter the impact on the surrounding area.237  Because acts of 
Congress are presumed constitutional, one cannot conclude that this is 
                                                          
 232. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 04.11.410 (West 2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23789(a) (West 
1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-21 (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-1011B (West 2006); 235 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-11 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-21-11 (West 2005); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1503 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-51 (West 1999 & Supp. 
2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 311.080 (2000 & Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-306 (2011); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 53-177 (2009 & Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-76 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-6B-10 (West 2003); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 64 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.26 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 518.3 (West 2009); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-7-19 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-6-120 (2009); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 125.68 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010). 
 233. ALA. CODE § 28-3-43 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-313 (West 2010); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-46 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 543(c) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 562.45 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 41-710 (2000 & Supp. 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.220 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 26:281 (2011); MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 9-201 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 340A.410 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-432 (West 1997 & Supp. 
2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-5-105 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32B-1-202 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.24.010 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
 234. See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text. 
 235. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 271. 
 236. Id. at 268. 
 237. This statement assumes the district has enough space open for a church to locate. 
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the result prayed for when Congress desired equal protection for 
religious and nonreligious assemblies. 
Before dismissing these examples as extreme, remember that, in the 
vast majority of cases, the textual interpretation and the similarly situated 
interpretation will reach the same conclusion.  Only in these fringe cases 
will local interests hold sway in creating livable cities. 
D. Adopting the Similarly Situated Requirement and Merging the Third 
and Seventh Circuits’ Tests 
Each of the tests presented above has problems.  The Third Circuit’s 
regulatory-purpose test fails to fully address Congress’s concerns about 
local officials’ discretionary control over religious land uses.  The 
Seventh Circuit’s test will become hard to implement outside the very 
limited circumstances present in River of Life.238  The problems with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test are myriad and addressed above.239  
Unfortunately, as Judge Cudahy warned, “the search . . . for an entirely 
objective test is probably in vain.”240 
1. Adopting the Similarly Situated Requirement 
This Comment’s main argument in favor of incorporating the 
similarly situated requirement is that a textual interpretation may violate 
the Establishment Clause and therefore must be avoided in favor of other 
well-reasoned tests.  This approach has the added benefit of staying away 
from basing the test strictly on adopting the similarly situated 
requirement from Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence to enforce a 
statute based on Free Exercise Clause principles.  In addition to the 
entirely valid reasons outlined by the Third and Seventh Circuits and at 
the risk of wading into this heated debate, this Comment contends that 
adopting the similarly situated requirement makes sense in the context of 
the Free Exercise Clause because it was essentially, though not 
explicitly, employed in previous Free Exercise Clause cases. 
                                                          
 238. The Seventh Circuit’s test will only apply if districts are zoned exclusively for one use, 
which is uncommon.  See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
374 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We are likely to have cases in the future challenging zoning 
ordinances that are harder to classify, as variances and special-use permits and grandfathered 
nonconforming uses blur the character of particular zoning districts.”). 
 239. See supra Part IV.A–C. 
 240. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 374–75 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
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In Lukumi, the city passed ordinances banning animal sacrifice when 
it discovered that members of the Santeria religion who practiced animal 
sacrifice planned to locate in the city.241  The purported purpose of the 
ordinances was to prohibit animal sacrifice as many in the community 
found it inhumane or especially cruel.242  But, the statutes were narrowly 
written and applied so that “few if any killings of animals [were] 
prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice.”243  The statute did not apply to 
Jewish groups who practiced kosher slaughter. 244  Nor did it apply to 
other “killings that [were] no more necessary or humane in almost all 
other circumstances.”245 
Thus, the ordinances in Lukumi failed for two reasons pertinent to 
the equal-terms provision, showing why the similarly situated 
requirement elucidates essential Free Exercise Clause principles.246  First, 
after comparing how the law’s purpose of forbidding religious killings 
affected the Santeria religion and similarly situated religious killings by 
those associated with Judaism, it was clear the city allowed some 
religious killings while it disallowed others, thereby affecting the 
ordinances’ proffered purpose.247  Second, after comparing how the law’s 
purpose of forbidding inhumane killings affected the types of killings by 
the Santeria members and other similarly situated methods of killings by 
others, it was clear the city allowed similar inhumane methods of killing 
by others that had the same effect on the ordinance’s purpose.248  As the 
similarly situated requirement is essentially what the Supreme Court 
used in Lukumi, there is an argument that it does not come solely from 
Equal Protection Clause cases. 
                                                          
 241. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525–26 (1993). 
 242. Id. at 535. 
 243. Id. at 536. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. The ordinances in Lukumi also failed because the officials evinced a pattern of 
discrimination in passing the ordinances, which showed a discriminatory intent.  Id. at 545–46 
(“[E]ach of Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s governmental interests only against conduct 
motivated by religious belief. . . .  This precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is 
designed to prevent.”). 
 247. Id. at 536. 
 248. Id. at 537. 
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2. Merging the Third and Seventh Circuits’ Tests 
After concluding that the similarly situated requirement is needed, 
the remainder of this Section discusses which, if any, test should be 
adopted.  This Section argues that the Seventh Circuit’s regulatory-
purpose test should control when possible, but in many cases the test will 
be inapplicable because it is very narrow and many land-use controls are 
inherently legislative.  In this case, the Third Circuit’s test should 
control. 
The Third and Seventh Circuits’ tests will lead to the same result on 
the great majority of cases because a district’s regulatory purpose will 
generally dictate its regulatory criteria.249  If the purpose is to generate 
taxes, then the district will have commercial regulatory criteria.  When 
possible, the Seventh Circuit’s regulatory-criteria test should control.  
The test limits local officials’ discretion and self-serving testimony to the 
greatest extent possible while still narrowing the equal-terms provision’s 
scope to prevent a collision with the Establishment Clause.  Courts may 
employ this construction whenever a district is zoned all commercial or 
all residential.  For instance, it could be employed in determining if 
Park51 should be allowed into the district in lower Manhattan.  The 
district is a general commercial zone and allows for virtually any 
commercial use except adult-entertainment clubs.250  A reviewing court 
would not need to look any further than New York City’s Commercial 
District Use Regulations to see that disallowing Park51 would be 
contrary to the district’s stated regulatory criteria.251  Such a test forces 
officials to be honest about their zoning requirements when they design 
the code and encourages them to be forthright with what they will and 
will not allow in a district. 
But many districts and many land-use devices—conditional-use 
permits and zoning variances come to mind—cannot avoid some level of 
discretionary judgment.  Unless society is ready to rid itself of these 
helpful devices, a proper test must account for them.  For instance, 
churches are commonly listed as conditional uses and may locate in a 
                                                          
 249. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 374 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (“[T]he practical distinction between ‘regulatory purpose’ 
and ‘regulatory criteria’ may not be as pronounced as the majority opinion suggests.”). 
 250. N.Y.C., N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. III, ch. 2, § 32-00–01 (2011), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art03c02.pdf. 
 251. Id. 
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district only if certain conditions are met.252  Granting a conditional-use 
permit “results from a legislative determination that such use will not 
ordinarily be detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood within the 
zone.”253  Zoning boards must consider certain criteria that help them 
account for potential problems in deciding whether to grant the 
conditional-use permit and allow the use in the area.254  The criteria, 
though, are often vague to the point of unhelpful—some ordinances only 
state that the conditional use must be “‘consistent with the public health, 
welfare, and safety’” in the district.255  If the regulatory criteria are broad, 
then they will not be especially helpful in eliminating discretion, and the 
court will have to fall back to considering the regulatory purpose. 
One way to limit discretion is to closely scrutinize the zoning codes 
and encourage or compel officials to justify a regulation’s purposes in 
writing.256  If the code does not provide a regulatory purpose, then the 
religious assembly should automatically be granted entry into the district.  
If the city does not provide a regulatory purpose, then it cannot show 
how a religious assembly would harm that district. 
The regulatory-criteria test is not unreasonable.  Regulatory purposes 
are not as easily disguised as critics contend, and decades of land-use 
decisions highlight proper regulatory purposes.  Further, judges often 
pass on self-serving testimony.  In analyzing the substantial-burdens 
provision and the Free Exercise Clause, judges must determine the 
validity of testimony and the likelihood that the predicted harms will 
result from the proposed land use.  Federal judges can determine when a 
local regulation impermissibly targets a religious assembly or whether a 
city’s reasoning or justification for doing so is unpersuasive, just as they 
do in free exercise and substantial-burdens cases. 
                                                          
 252. Shelby D. Green, Zoning In and Out Churches: Limits on Municipal Zoning Powers by the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 163, 169 (2008) (“Many 
municipalities have included religious operations in the category of uses requiring special permits or 
special exceptions, particularly in areas zoned residential.”). 
 253. Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 226–27 (Me. 1983) (citing Cmty. Sch., 
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 369 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 1977)). 
 254. SPRANKLING, supra note 62, § 37.04. 
 255. Id. 
 256. The Third Circuit did this to a degree in Lighthouse.  See supra note 136–38 and 
accompanying text (stating that the Lighthouse court found an equal-terms violation in part because 
the city did not have a regulatory purpose for the court to compare the church against to see if it 
would harm the district). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s textual approach is not simply a codification 
of the Smith–Lukumi free exercise line of cases.  A textual interpretation 
results in an accommodation greater than that required by free exercise 
jurisprudence because this approach does not allow a city to escape 
liability even if its law is neutral and generally applicable.  Further, it is 
an impermissible accommodation because strict scrutiny is not required, 
which results in a textual approach that fails to account for the law’s 
burdens on its nonbeneficiaries.  Courts should avoid this improper 
interpretation and combine the best parts of the Third and Seventh 
Circuits’ tests.  This modified test tracks Congress’s intent to limit 
individualized discretion and ensures equal, not preferred, treatment. 
